
Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions
A seller chooses a reserve price in a secondprice auction to maximize w...
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Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information
We consider the model of the data broker selling information to a single...
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Optimizing Affine Maximizer Auctions via Linear Programming: an Application to Revenue Maximizing Mechanism Design for ZeroDay Exploits Markets
Optimizing within the affine maximizer auctions (AMA) is an effective ap...
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Learning Optimal Redistribution Mechanisms through Neural Networks
We consider a setting where p public resources are to be allocated among...
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Maximizing Welfare with IncentiveAware Evaluation Mechanisms
Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate d...
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A GameTheoretic Approach to a Task Delegation Problem
We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a co...
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Simple, Credible, and ApproximatelyOptimal Auctions
We identify the first static credible mechanism for multiitem additive ...
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An Optimal Distributionally Robust Auction
An indivisible object may be sold to one of n agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenuemaximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the means (which may be different) and an upper bound for valuations. Valuations may be correlated. Using a constructive approach based on duality, we prove that a mechanism that maximizes the worstcase expected revenue among all deterministic dominantstrategy incentive compatible, ex post individually rational mechanisms is such that the object should be awarded to the agent with the highest linear score provided it is nonnegative. Linear scores are bidderspecific linear functions of bids. The set of optimal mechanisms includes other mechanisms but all those have to be close to the optimal linear score auction in a certain sense. When means are high, all optimal mechanisms share the linearity property. Secondprice auction without a reserve is an optimal mechanism when the number of symmetric bidders is sufficiently high.
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